Replacing the do-calculus with Bayes rule by Lattimore, Finnian & Rohde, David
Replacing the do-calculus with Bayes rule
Finnian Lattimore∗
The Gradient Institute
Sydney
David Rohde†
Criteo AI Lab
Paris
Abstract
The concept of causality has a controversial
history. The question of whether it is possi-
ble to represent and address causal problems
with probability theory, or if fundamentally new
mathematics such as the do-calculus is required
has been hotly debated, e.g. [Pearl, 2001] states
‘the building blocks of our scientific and every-
day knowledge are elementary facts such as
“mud does not cause rain” and “symptoms do
not cause disease” and those facts, strangely
enough, cannot be expressed in the vocabulary
of probability calculus’. This has lead to a di-
chotomy between advocates of causal graphical
modeling and the do-calculus, and researchers
applying Bayesian methods. In this paper we
demonstrate that, while it is critical to explicitly
model our assumptions on the impact of inter-
vening in a system, provided we do so, estimat-
ing causal effects can be done entirely within
the standard Bayesian paradigm. The invari-
ance assumptions underlying causal graphical
models can be encoded in ordinary Probabilistic
graphical models, allowing causal estimation
with Bayesian statistics, equivalent to the do-
calculus. Elucidating the connections between
these approaches is a key step toward enabling
the insights provided by each to be combined
to solve real problems.
1 Introduction
The do-calculus [Pearl, 1995] is a powerful body of the-
ory that provides three additional rules for probability the-
ory on the basis that probability theory alone is not suffi-
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cient for solving causal problems (an argument prosecuted
forcefully by Pearl in several places e.g. [Pearl, 2001]).
In this paper we provide side by side analysis of four
classic causal problems: the two cases responsible for
Simpson’s reversal, and two cases with unobserved con-
founders. These four analyses are strongly suggestive that
the do-calculus and Bayesian inference can both be used
in order to make causal estimates, although this is not to
suggest that each approach does not have its strengths and
weaknesses.
A fully Bayesian approach leverages a vast body of ex-
isting research and is able to account for finite sample
uncertainties. On the other hand the do-calculus has sim-
pler graphs and is sometimes a more direct approach, also
some of the results pertaining to unobserved confounders
were discovered using the do-calculus (in particular re-
sults for front door adjustment and M-Bias) and while
we show these results can be transferred in the Bayesian
paradigm the mechanism for systematically doing so in a
tractable manner remains unclear.
While there is much to be discussed about the similarities
and differences between the two approaches we mostly
leave this outside scope and simply provide the four exam-
ples side by side. The paper has the following structure,
in Section 2 we outline the two methodologies in a suf-
ficiently general framework that either could be used to
solve causal problems. In Section 3 we outline the two
fully observed problems, here we focus on Simpson’s
paradox. In Section 4 we outline two problems involving
unobserved confounders; the causality non-identifiable
case and the front door rule; concluding remarks are made
in Section 5.
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2 Two schools of thought
2.1 Probabilistic graphical models
Probabilistic graphical models (PGMs) combine graph
theory with probability theory in order to develop new
algorithms and to present models in an intuitive frame-
work [Jordan, 2004]. A Probabilistic graphical model is
a directed acyclic graph over variables, which represents
how the joint distribution over these variables may be
factorized. In particular, any missing edge in the graph
must correspond to a conditional independence relation
in the joint distribution. There are multiple valid Proba-
bilistic graphical model representations for a given joint
distribution. For example, any joint distribution over two
variables (X,Y ) may be represented by both X → Y or
X ← Y .
2.2 Causal Graphical Models And The Do-Calculus
A causal graphical model (CGM) is a Probabilistic graph-
ical model, with the additional assumption that a link
X → Y means X causes Y . Think of the data generating
process for a CGM as sampling data first for the exoge-
nous variables (those with no parents in the graph), and
then in subsequent steps sampling values for the children
of previously sampled nodes. An atomic intervention in
such a system that sets the value of a specific variable T
to a fixed constant corresponds to removing all links into
T - as it is now set exogenously, rather than determined
by its previous causes. It is assumed that everything else
in the system remains unchanged, in particular the func-
tions or conditional distributions that determine the value
of a variable given its parents in the graph. In this way,
a CGM encodes more than the factorization (or condi-
tional independence structure) of the joint distribution
over its variables; It additionally specifies how the system
responds to atomic interventions.
A CGM describes how the structure of a system is mod-
ified by an intervention. However, answering causal
queries such as "what would the distribution of can-
cer look like if we were able to prevent smoking?" re-
quires inference about the distributions of variables in
the post-interventional system. The do-notation is a
short-hand for describing the distribution of variables
post-intervention and the do-calculus is a set of rules for
identifying which (conditional) distributions are equiv-
alent pre and post-intervention. If it is possible to de-
rive an expression for the desired post-interventional dis-
tribution purely in terms of the joint distribution over
the original system via the do-calculus then the causal
query is identifiable, meaning assuming positive den-
sity and infinite data we obtain a point estimate for
it. The do-calculus is complete; A query is identifi-
able if and only if it can be solved via the do-calculus
[Shpitser and Pearl, 2006, Huang and Valtorta, 2006].
Here we present the do-calculus in a simplified form that
applies to interventions on single variables - which is
sufficient for the examples presented in this paper. The
full form of the do-calculus applies to interventions on
any subset of variables - see [Pearl, 1995, Pearl, 2009,
Peters et al., 2017].
The do-calculus Let G be a CGM, GT represent G
post-intervention (i.e with all links into T removed) and
GT represent G with all links out of T removed. Let
do(t) represent intervening to set a single variable T to t,
Rule 1: P(y|do(t), z, w) = P(y|do(t), z) if Y ⊥⊥
W |(Z, T ) in GT
Rule 2: P(y|do(t), z) = P(y|t, z) if Y ⊥⊥ T |Z in GT
Rule 3: P(y|do(t), z) = P(y|z) if Y ⊥⊥ T |Z in GT ,
and Z is not a decedent of T .
2.3 Representing a Causal Problem with a
Probabilistic graphical model
While PGMs and CGMs may appear similar, there are
key differences between them, both in the information
they represent and how they are typically applied. CGMs
are used to determine if a given query is identifiable and
to obtain an expression for it in terms of the original
joint distribution - with estimation of this expression a
follow up step; latent variables are introduced to capture
dependence induced by unobserved variables that may
complicate identification of causal effects and links are
not reversible. By contrast in PGMs links can be reversed,
model specific details for estimation - including plates
& parameters - are included graphically, and latent vari-
ables (of a specific form) are introduced for computational
reasons, usually to coerce the model into complete data
exponential family form.
To represent an intervention with an ordinary Probabilistic
graphical model, we must explicitly model the pre and
post intervention systems and the relationship between
them.
Algorithm 1: CausalBayesConstruct
Input: Causal graph G and intervention do(T = t).
Output: Probabilistic graphical model representing this
intervention
1. Draw the original causal graph G inside a plate in-
dexed from 1, ...M to represent the data generating
process.
2. For each variable V ∈ G, parameterize
P (V |parents(V )) by adding a parameter θV with
a link into V .
3. Draw the graph after the intervention by setting T =
t and removing all links into it. Rename each of the
variables to distinguish them from the variables in
the original graph, e.g. X becomes X∗.
4. Connect the two graphs linking θV to the correspond-
ing variable V ∗ in the post-interventional graph, for
each V excluding T .
A PGM constructed with Algorithm 1 represents exactly
the same assumptions about a specific intervention as the
corresponding CGM, see Figures 1 and 3 for an exam-
ple. We have just explicitly created a joint model over
the system pre and post-intervention, which allows the
direct application of standard statistical inference, rather
than requiring additional notation and operations that map
from one to the other - as the do-calculus does. The
Bayesian model is specified by the parameterization of
the conditional distribution of variables given their par-
ents, and priors may be placed on the parameters θ. The
fact that the parameters are shared for all pairs of variables
(V, V ∗) excluding T , captures the assumption that all that
is changed by the intervention is the way T takes its value
- the conditional distributions for all other variables given
their parents are invariant.
Despite its simplicity we are unaware of a direct statement
of Algorithm 1, it is related to twin networks [Pearl, 2009]
and augmented directed acyclic graphs [Dawid, 2015] but
is distinct from both.
2.4 Causal Inference with Probabilistic graphical
models
The result of Algorithm 1 is a Probabilistic graphical
model on which we can do inference with standard prob-
ability theory rather than the do-calculus, and which
has properties such as arrow reversal (by the use of
Bayes rule). To infer causal effects we compute a predic-
tive distribution for the quantity of interest in the post-
intervention graph using Bayes rule, integrating out all
parameters, latent variables and any observed variables
that are not of interest, for each setting of the treatment
T = t∗.
To make this procedure clearer, let V be the set of vari-
ables in the original causal graph G, excluding the vari-
able we intervene on, T , and V ∗ be the corresponding
variables in the post-interventional graph. We have:
• θ: the set of model parameters.
• v: a matrix of the M observations of variables V ,
(v1, ...,vM ) collected pre-intervention.
• t: a vector of theM observed values of the treatment
variable T , t1, ..tM , and
• v∗: The variables of the system post-intervention.
• t∗: the value that the intervened on variable T is set
to.
• Y ∗ ∈ v∗: the variable of interest post-intervention.
The goal is to infer the value of the unobserved post-
interventional distribution over v∗, given the observed
data and (v, t) and a selected treatment t∗. By con-
struction, conditional on the parameters θ, the post-
interventional variables v∗ are independent of data col-
lected pre-intervention (v, t). The value of the inter-
vention t∗ is set exogenously1 - so is independent of
both θ and (v, t). This ensures joint distribution over
(v, t,v∗,θ) factorize into three terms: a prior over the
parameters P(θ), the likelihood for the original sys-
tem P(v, t|θ), and a predictive distribution for the post-
interventional variables given parameters and intervention
P(v∗|θ, t∗):
P(v, t,v∗,θ|t∗) = P(θ)P(v, t|θ)P(v∗|θ, t∗)
We then marginalize out θ,
P(v, t,v∗|t∗) =
∫
θ
P(θ)P(v, t|θ)P(v∗|θ, t∗)dθ (1)
and condition on the observed data (v, t),
P(v∗|v, t, t∗) = P(v, t,v
∗|t∗)
P(v, t|t∗)
=
∫
θ
P(θ)P(v, t|θ)
P(v, t)
P(v∗|θ, t∗)dθ
=
∫
θ
P(θ|v, t)P(v∗|θ, t∗)dθ. (2)
Finally, if the goal is to infer mean treatment effects2 on a
specific variable post-intervention Y ∗, we can marginalize
out the remaining variables in V ∗,
P(Y ∗|v, t, t∗) =
∫
θ
P(θ|v, t)
∑
V ∗\Y ∗
P(v∗|θ, t∗)dθ.
(3)
1Also t∗ has no marginal distribution - it is a constant set by
the intervention
2We could also compute conditional treatment effects by
first conditioning on selected variables in v∗.
If there are no latent variables in G, assuming positive
density over the domain of (v, t) and a well defined
prior P(θ), the likelihood P(v, t|θ) will dominate, and
the posterior over the parameters P(θ|v, t) will become
independent of the prior at the infinite data limit. The
term P(v∗|θ, t∗) can be expanded into a product of terms
of the form P(V ∗|parents(V ∗),θ) following the factor-
ization implied by the post-interventional graph. From
step (3) of Algorithm 1 each of these terms are equal
to the corresponding terms P(V |parents(V ),θ), giving
results equivalent to Pearl’s truncated product formula
[Pearl, 2009].
The presence of latent variables in G adds complications
which we defer to Section 4.
3 Simpson’s Paradox (Fully Observed)
Simpson’s paradox provides an excellent case study for
demonstrating that raw data cannot be used for inferring
causality without further assumptions. In this section,
we show how we can infer treatment effects and resolve
the paradox, with either the do-calculus or via Bayesian
inference, and that these approaches yield equivalent re-
sults. Assume we have a table of data on some outcome
Y for two different treatments (T ) broken down by a third
variable Z as shown in Table 1.
z t y N
0 0 0 150
0 0 1 50
0 1 0 180
0 1 1 180
1 0 0 50
1 0 1 200
1 1 0 4
1 1 1 36
Table 1: Example Data
By estimating probabilities as past frequencies we obtain
the following conditional probabilities:
P (Y = 1|Z = 0, T = 0) = 0.25
P (Y = 1|Z = 0, T = 1) = 0.5
P (Y = 1|Z = 1, T = 0) = 0.8
P (Y = 1|Z = 1, T = 1) = 0.9
P (Y = 1|T = 0) = 0.56 P (Y = 1|T = 1) = 0.54
The paradox Treatment T = 0 seems best overall, but
if we break the data down by Z then, regardless of which
value of Z a patient has, treatment T = 1 seems bet-
ter. If we had to select a single treatment for everyone -
Z
T Y
Z
T Y
Figure 1: A CGM of Case 1: Left observational, Right:
mutilated
which should it be? The key to resolving this question
is to realize that what we care about in this setting is
the expected outcome of intervening in the system to set
T , (in Pearl’s notation P(Y |do(T ))) rather than either of
the conditional distributions P(Y |T ) or P(Y |T,Z). As
a result, which treatment is preferred hinges on causal
assumptions, which we may specify using a CGM or a
PGM.
3.1 Simpson’s Paradox Case 1
Figure 2: The graphs G, GT and GT for case 1.
Imagine that our observations are generated by CGM
given in Figure 1, where the covariate Z is a cause of both
Zm
Tm Ym
m=1..M
Z∗
T ∗ Y ∗
γφ
ψ
Figure 3: A PGM of Case 1
T and Y . Applying the rules of the do-calculus gives:
P(y|do(T = t)) =
∑
z
P(y, z|do(T = t))
=
∑
z
P(y|do(T = t), z)P(z|do(T = t))
=
∑
z
P(y|t, z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rule 2:(Y ⊥⊥ T |Z in GT )
P(z)︸︷︷︸
Rule 3:(Z ⊥⊥ T in GT )
See Figure 2 for G, GT and GT in case 1.
To find the same solution using a Bayesian approach we
first apply CausalBayesConstruct on CGM Figure 1 to
produce the PGM in Figure 3. We then explicitly pa-
rameterize the model and write out the three model com-
ponents, the post intervention predictive, the likelihood
component and the prior component.
We use the following parameterization:
P(y|t, z,ψ) = ψyt,z(1−ψt,z)1−y = P(y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ),
P(z|γ) = γz(1− γ)1−z = P(z∗|γ),
P(t|z,φ) = φtz(1− φ)1−z.
The post intervention predictive is:
P(y∗|t∗,ψ,γ) =
∑
z∗
P(y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ)P(z∗|γ).
=
∑
z
ψy
∗
t∗,z(1−ψt∗,z)1−y
∗
γz(1− γ)1−z
The likelihood component is:
P(y|t, z,ψ)P(t|z,φ)P(z|γ)
=
∏
m
ψymtm,zm(1−ψtm,zm)1−ym
× φtmzm(1− φ)1−zmγzm(1− γ)1−zm
By de Finetti’s strong law of large num-
bers [De Finetti, 1980] as M → ∞ the
posterior concentrate on a single point
ψˆ, φˆ, γˆ and ψˆ
y
t,z(1− ψˆt,z)1−y → P(y|t, z) and
γˆz(1− γˆ)1−z → P(z), consequently:
limM→∞
∑
z
ψˆ
y∗
t∗,z(1− ψˆt∗,z∗)1−y
∗
γˆz(1− γˆ)1−z
→
∑
z
P(y|t, z)P(z).
Which demonstrates the agreement between the Bayesian
solution and the solution found using the do-calculus at
large samples.
This convergence is usually very fast and good agreement
will also be found for low sample sizes (where instead of
Zm
Tm Ym
Zm
Tm Ym
Figure 4: A CGM of Case 2: Left observational, Right:
mutilated
using the point estimate we integrate over the posterior)
e.g. under uniform priors the posterior of the parameters
will have Beta distributions; and the predictive distribu-
tion giving the causal inference can be computed using the
“Laplace smoothing algorithm” which involves adding one
to the counts before normalizing.
Returning to the numerical example applying the do-
calculus using the maximum likelihood algorithm we
obtain:
P(y|do(T = t))
= P(y|t, Z = 0)P(Z = 0) + P(y|t, Z = 1)P(Z = 1)
so
P(Y = 1|do(T = 0)) = 50
200
560
850
+
200
250
290
850
≈ 0.4376471
P(Y = 1|do(T = 1)) = 180
360
560
850
+
36
40
290
850
≈ 0.6364706
Assuming uniform priors and applying the Bayesian solu-
tion we obtain:
P(Y ∗ = 1|T ∗ = 0, t,y, z) = 51
202
561
852
+
201
252
291
852
≈ 0.4386687
P(Y ∗ = 1|T ∗ = 1, t,y, z) = 181
362
561
852
+
37
42
291
852
≈ 0.630114
We see good agreement between the two methods with
the only difference being the prior impact due to the finite
sample. We also see that T = 1 is the better treatment
(assuming that Y = 1 is the desired outcome).
4 Simpson’s Paradox Case 2
Imagine that our observations are generated by CGM
given in Figure 4. Using the do-calculus we get the result
Figure 5: The graphs G, GT and GT for case 2.
Zm
Tm Ym
m=1..M
Z∗
T ∗ Y ∗
γφ
ψ
Figure 6: A PGM of Case 2
in one step:
P(y|do(T = t)) = P(y|T = t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rule 2
, since Y ⊥⊥ T in GT
=
∑
z
P(y, z|t)
see Figure 5 to see the meaning of GT .
To find the same solution using a Bayesian approach we
first apply CausalBayesConstruct on CGM Figure 4 to
produce the PGM in Figure 6. We then explicitly pa-
rameterize the model and write out the three model com-
ponents, the post intervention predictive, the likelihood
component and the prior component.
We use the following parameterization:
P(y|t, z,ψ) = ψyt,z(1−ψt,z)1−y = P(y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ),
P(z|t,γ) = γzt (1− γt)1−z = P(z∗|t∗,γ),
P(t|φ) = φt(1− φ)1−t.
The post intervention predictive is:
P(y∗|t∗,ψ,γ) =
=
∑
z∗
P(y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ)P(z∗|t∗,γ)
=
∑
z
ψyt,z(1−ψt,z)1−yγzt (1− γt)1−z
The likelihood component is:
P(y|t, z,ψ)P(z|t,γ)P(t|φ) =∏
m
ψymtm,zm(1−ψtm,zm)1−ym
× γzmtm (1− γtm)1−zmφtm(1− φ)1−tm
Again by de Finetti’s strong law of large numbers as
M → ∞ the the posterior concentrate on a single
point ψˆ, φˆ, γˆ and ψˆ
y
t,z(1− ψˆt,z)1−y → P(y|t, z) and
γˆzt (1− γˆt)1−z → P(z|t), consequently:
limM→∞
∑
z
ψˆ
y∗
t∗,z(1− ψˆt∗,z)1−y
∗
γˆzt∗(1− γˆt∗)1−z
→
∑
z
P(y, z|t)
Showing that again there is large sample agreement be-
tween the two methods, Similarly, convergence is usually
very fast and there is close agreement for even small sam-
ples.
Returning to the numerical example applying the do-
calculus using the maximum likelihood algorithm we
obtain:
P(Y = 1|do(T = 0)) = 250
450
≈ 0.5555556
P(Y = 1|do(T = 1)) = P(y|t) = 216
400
≈ 0.54
Assuming uniform priors and applying the Bayesian solu-
tion again using the Laplace smoothing result we obtain:
P(Y ∗ = 1|T ∗ = 0, t,y, z) = 51
202
201
452
+
201
252
251
452
≈ 0.5551989
P(Y ∗ = 1|T ∗ = 1, t,y, z) = 181
362
361
402
+
37
42
41
402
≈ 0.5388534
Again we see good agreement between the two methods
with the only difference being the prior impact due to
the finite sample. We also see that T = 0 is the better
treatment.
Note that the distribution over P(z, t, y) is identical for
both Case 1 and Case 2, and yet the optimal treatment
differs. The paradox is resolved by understanding that the
difference is due to different model assumptions about the
impact of intervening on T , and we have demonstrated
that these assumptions can be expressed either with a
CGM or an extended PGM.
ZT Y
Z
T Y
Figure 7: CGM Where Causality Is “not identifiable”:
Left observational, Right: mutilated
Zm
Tm Ym
m=1..M
Z∗
T ∗ Y ∗
γφ
ψ
Figure 8: PGM Where Causality Is “not identifiable”
5 With Unobserved Confounders
Unobserved confounders (or latent variables) are hidden
variables that can complicate causal inference at best and
at worst render it impossible. While a direct attack us-
ing the pre-specified methodology does allow Bayesian
inference to solve these problems, this is achieved by
marginalizing out a complex latent variable the size of
which grows with the data set. Usually the inclusion of
the latent variable is not viable and the model must be
marginalize to remove it and re-parameterized. Whether
this is possible in a way that allows causation to be iden-
tified depends on the structure of the graph. If it isn’t
possible to identify all parameters that have a causal im-
pact then prior distributions will have an impact even in
the large data limit.
5.1 When Causality Cannot Be Identified
The simplest graphical model where causation becomes
impossible even with unlimited samples is shown in Fig-
ure 7. This fact is demonstrated in the do-calculus by the
fact that there is no way to apply the 3 rules in order to
obtain P(y|do(t)).
In this problem we consider T to be have two states and
Y to have two states, but the latent variable or unobserved
confounder Z is of arbitrary complexity. This reflects
many real life problems e.g. T could represent the pres-
ence of some substance in a person’s diet (so it is binary),
Y could represent some binary health outcome and Z
could represent socio-economic circumstances of a per-
son affecting both T and Y .
Following the same prescription as before; to find the
same solution using a Bayesian approach we first apply
CausalBayesConstruct on CGM Figure 7 to produce the
PGM in Figure 8. We then explicitly parameterize the
model and write out the three model components, the
post intervention predictive component, the likelihood
component and the prior component. The first step of
parameterization is complicated by the fact that Z is both
latent and high dimensional this results in posteriors over
the parameters that are not-identifiable and high dimen-
sional, we will also consider a re-parameterization which
partially mitigates these difficulties.
We use the following parameterization:
P(y|t, z,ψ) = ψyt,z(1−ψt,z)1−y = P(y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ)
P(z|γ) = γz∗ = P(z∗|γ),
P(t|z,φ) = φtz(1− φz)1−t.
The post intervention predictive is:
P(y∗|t∗,ψ,γ) =
∑
z∗
P (y∗|t∗, z∗,ψ)P (z∗|γ)
=
∑
z
ψy
∗
t∗,z(1−ψt∗,z)1−y
∗
γz
≡ Ψt∗,y∗
We introduce the low dimensional Ψ as a re-
parameterization of ψ,γ as statistically identifying this
parameter is sufficient for making causal inference.
Unfortunately when we write the likelihood we see we
cannot identify this parameter, but rather a different low
dimensional function of ψ,φ,γ:
P(y∗, t∗|ψ,φ,γ)
=
∑
z
P(y∗|t∗, z,ψ)P(t∗|z,φ)P(z|γ)
=
∑
z
ψy
∗
t∗,z(1−ψt∗,z)1−y
∗
φt
∗
z (1− φz)1−t
∗
γz∗
≡ Ωt∗,y∗ .
We introduce the low dimensional Ω as a re-
parameterization of ψ,φ,γ as this parameter is identifi-
able.
We can now see the difficulty in this problem, we need
Ψ but can only infer Ω. Both, Ω andΨ are different low
dimensional projections of (ψ,φ,γ); Ω is identifiable
and Ψ is causally relevant, they are related due to the
Um
WmTm Ym
Um
WmTm Ym
Figure 9: A CGM for the Front Door Rule: Top the
original graph, Bottom: the mutilated graph
fact that they are both functions of ψ and γ, so it may be
reasonable to specify a joint prior P(Ψ,Ω) giving:
P(y∗|t∗,y, t)
=
∫
Ψ
∫
Ω
P(y∗|t∗,Ψ)P(Ψ|Ω)P(Ω|y, t)dΩdΨ.
In specifying priors for this problem, we may reasonably
use default priors (e.g. flat priors) for Ω (or even take
a point estimate) as it is identifiable with modest data
sets. On the other hand P(Ψ|Ω) will be completely un-
affected by the data so it is an extremely important that
any information concerning on howΩ affects knowledge
ofΨ is carefully assessed; in many instances this will be
considered too difficult to reasonably attempt, e.g. it may
be that P(Ψ|Ω) = P(Ψ) in which case the data adds no
value to causal problems at all.
5.2 The Front Door Rule
Imagine that our observations are generated by the CGM
given in Figure 9, which is the graph that requires the
front door rule. The front door rule is remarkable in that
it shows that a graph quite similar to Figure 7 does allow
causation to be identifiable, the only difference being
another observed node between the treatment and the
outcome.
Using the do-calculus gives (detailed steps in
[Pearl, 1995]):
P(y|do(T = t)) =
∑
w
P(w|t)
∑
t′
P(y|t′, w)P(t′). (4)
To find the same solution using a Bayesian approach we
first apply CausalBayesConstruct on CGM Figure 9 to
produce the PGM in Figure 10. We then explicitly pa-
rameterize the model and write out the three model com-
ponents. Again we are hampered by the presence of u,
but for this problem we can effectively marginalize and
re-parameterize the model to make causation identifiable.
We use the following parameterization:
P(y|w, u,ψ) = ψyw,u(1−ψw,u)1−y = P(y∗|w∗, u∗,ψ),
P(w|t,λ) = λwt (1− λt)1−w = P(w∗|t∗,λ),
P(u|γ) = γu = P(u∗|γ),
P(t|u,φ) = φtu(1− φu)1−t.
The post intervention predictive is:
P(y∗|t∗,ψ,γ,λ)
=
∑
w∗
P (w∗|t∗,λ)
∑
u∗
P(u∗|γ)P(y∗|w∗, u∗,ψ).
And the likelihood component is:
P(y, t,w|ψ,λ,γ,φ)
=
∏
m
∑
um
ψymwm,um(1−ψwm,um)1−ymλwmtm (1− λ)1−wm
× φtm(1− φ)1−tmγum .
Unfortunately, the fact that u is both latent and large
means that the posterior over ψ,γ,φ is both non-
identifiable and high dimensional (although the marginal
posterior over λ is identifiable, since it depends only on
W and T ). A direct attack would require sophisticated
Bayesian approximation methods to capture the complex
structure within the posterior and is not within the scope
of this paper. Instead, we note that u can be eliminated
from the 2nd term in the post-intervention predictive dis-
tribution:
Um
WmTm Ym
m=1..M
U∗
W ∗T ∗ Y ∗
γφ
ψλ
Figure 10: A Bayesian Model for the Front Door Rule
∑
u
P(u|γ)P(y|w, u,ψ)
=
∑
u
∑
t
P(u, t|γ,φ)P(y|w, u,ψ)
=
∑
u
∑
t
(
P(u, t|γ,φ)P(w|t,λ)P(y|w, u,ψ)
P(w|t,λ)
)
=
∑
t
(∑
u P(u, t, w, y|γ,φ,λ,ψ)
P(w|t,λ)
)
=
∑
t
P(t|γ,φ)
P(w, t|γ,φ,λ)P(y, t, w|γ,φ,λ,ψ)
=
∑
t
P(t|γ,φ)P(y|t, w,γ,φ,λ,ψ)
6=
∑
t
P(y, t|w,γ,φ,λ,ψ) as P(t|γ,φ) 6= P(t|w,γ,φ)
We explicitly note this is not a joint distribution of y, t|w.
Although it is a purely probabilistic expression, it is a
distinctly Pearlian one. We re-parameterize:
Ωy,t,w ≡∑
uψ
y
w,u(1−ψw,u)1−yλwt (1− λt)1−wφtu(1− φu)1−tγu
λwt (1− λt)1−w
This allows us to write the post-intervention predictive
distribution as,
P(y∗|t∗,Ω,λ) =
∑
w
λwt∗(1− λt∗)1−w
∑
t
Ωy,t,,w
=
∑
u
∑
w
ψyw,u(1−ψw,u)1−yλwt (1− λt)1−wγu
and the likelihood becomes,
P(y, t,w|Ω,λ) =
∏
m
Ωym,tm,wmλ
wm
tm (1− λtm)1−wm .
As we have an expression for the causal quantities in terms
of Ω,λ we are able to identify the parameters needed to
make causal estimates.
Finally we establish that the Bayesian solution converges
to the unusual do-calculus expression given in Equation 4.
The expression is unusual due to the fact that t is both
conditioned on and marginalized.
Again by de Finetti’s strong law of large numbers as as
M →∞ the the posterior concentrate on a single point
Ωˆ, λˆ, consequently:
limM→∞
∑
t′
Ωˆy,t′,w →
∑
t′
P(t′)P(y|t′, w)
and:
limM→∞λˆ
w
t (1− λˆt)1−w → P(w|t)
We once again obtain agreement with the Bayesian solu-
tion and the do-calculus:
limM→∞
∑
w
λˆ
w
t∗(1− λˆt∗)1−w
∑
t
Ωˆy,t,w
→
∑
w
P(w|t)
∑
t′
P(t′)P(y|t′, w)
Again due to the rapid convergence there will be good
agreement also for small samples.
6 Conclusion
The paper shows that it is possible to arrive at the same so-
lution for causal problems using both the do-calculus
and Bayesian theory, the key insight required for the
Bayesian formulation is that the probabilistic graphical
model must model both the pre-intervention and post
intervention world separately, this is perhaps the major
contribution we make otherwise our conclusion is sim-
ilar to [Lindley et al., 1981]. Even though it has been
long suggested that probability alone was insufficient for
modeling causal systems (e.g. [Pearl, 1995, Pearl, 2001,
Pearl, 2009, Pearl, 2014] ) it is perhaps unsurprising that
Bayesian theory can accommodate these situations given
its long history as arising from axiomizing reasoning un-
der uncertainty (see [De Finetti, 1974, De Finetti, 1980,
Lindley, 2000, Bernardo and Smith, 2009]).
There remains work to be done for a full unification.
The key benefits of the Bayesian approach are correct
finite sample behavior, and the ability to produce infer-
ence under situations which would be deemed unidentifi-
able under the do-calculus; this may be possible because
Bayesian approaches are able to assume that conditional
independence assumptions hold with high probability
or approximately hold and then proceed, where the do-
calculus applies hard tests of conditional independence.
The do-calculus has advantages in its ability to discard
variables and reduce dimensionality and in its ability
to identify re-parameterizations such as in the case of
the front door rule which enable causality to be identifi-
able in surprising cases. Furthermore, the do-calculus is
complete: we can obtain a point estimate for a causal
query, without parametric assumptions on the model,
if and only if we can express the query as a func-
tion of the observable, joint distribution pre-intervention
via repeated application of the do-calculus and stan-
dard probability algebra [Huang and Valtorta, 2006,
Shpitser and Pearl, 2006]. There is an algorithm
[Shpitser and Pearl, 2012] that, for a given CGM and
causal query, will determine if the query is identifiable
via the do-calculus and; if it is, returns an expression for
it in terms of the observable pre-interventional distribu-
tion. We speculate the algorithm could be adapted to the
Bayesian context in order to automate the discovery of
parameter transforms like the one we demonstrated for
the front door rule.
A rich program of research is therefore open, some top-
ics we think deserving of attention are: a comparison of
the do-calculus and Bayesian approaches for instrumen-
tal variable models, CGM graphs where the do-calculus
produces multiple solutions, CGM graphs where the do-
calculus cannot identify but can produce bounds, CGM
graphs where parametric assumptions are used in combi-
nation with the CGM in order to achieve identifiability
and causal exploration where data is used to discover
links before attempting a causal analysis. We hope other
researchers will take up these challenges.
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